The impact of transfer pricing regulations on profit shifting within European multinationals by Lohse, Theresa & Riedel, Nadine
 FZID Discussion Papers
Universität Hohenheim | Forschungszentrum Innovation und Dienstleistung 
www.fzid.uni-hohenheim.de
CC Economics
Discussion Paper 61-2012
THE IMPACT OF TRANSFER PRICING 
REGULATIONS ON PROFIT SHIFTING WITHIN 
EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS
Theresa Lohse
Nadine Riedel 
Universität Hohenheim | Forschungszentrum Innovation und Dienstleistung
www.fzid.uni-hohenheim.de
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper 61-2012 
 
 
 
 
  
The Impact of Transfer Pricing Regulations on  
Profit Shifting within European Multinationals 
 
 
Theresa Lohse 
Nadine Riedel 
 
 
 
 
Download this Discussion Paper from our homepage: 
 
https://fzid.uni-hohenheim.de/71978.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1867-934X (Printausgabe)  
ISSN 1868-0720 (Internetausgabe) 
 
 
 
 
 
Die FZID Discussion Papers dienen der schnellen Verbreitung von 
Forschungsarbeiten des FZID. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung  
der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des FZID dar. 
 
 
FZID Discussion Papers are intended to make results of FZID research available to the public  
in order to encourage scientific discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely  
responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the FZID. 
 
 
The Impact of Transfer Pricing Regulations on
Profit Shifting within European Multinationals
Theresa Lohse
University of Mannheim
Nadine Riedel∗
University of Hohenheim
December 9, 2012
Abstract
Over the past decade, several countries augmented their national tax
law by transfer pricing legislations in order to limit opportunities for tax-
motivated transfer price distortions and the associated relocation of multna-
tional income from their borders. The aim of this paper is to empirically
investigate the impact of transfer pricing laws on multinational profit shifting
behaviour. To do so, we collect unique data on the evolution of national trans-
fer price requirements in Europe over the past decade. This data is linked to
accounting information on multinational firms in the EU and to corporate
tax rate data. In line with previous studies, we find that multinational firms
engage in significant tax-motivated profit shifting behaviour. The analysis fur-
thermore suggests that transfer price documentation rules are instrumental
in restricting income shifting activities. The effect is statistically significant
and economically relevant. Our analysis thus underpins the benefits of im-
plementing transfer price documentation requirements and suggests that they
may be socially desirable despite the high administrative burden they impose
on firms and tax authorities.
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Keywords: corporate taxation, international profit shifting, transfer price docu-
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the literature has provided compelling evidence that multinational
entities (MNEs) strategically relocate income across affiliate in order to reduce their
overall tax bill (see e.g. Hines (1999) and Devereux and Maffini (2007) for surveys).
This type of shifting activity may significantly impact on countries’ corporate tax
revenues. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) find that in 1999 the corporate tax base of
Germany, which was the country with the highest corporate tax rate in Europe at
that time, would have been by 14% larger in the absence of tax rate differentials
between European countries. One channel through which MNEs relocate income
to foreign low-tax affiliates is the distortion of prices for intra-firm trade. Recent
empirical evidence moreover suggests transfer pricing to be quantitatively important
relative to other shifting channels, especially in MNEs with intangible property
holdings (see e.g. Clausing, 2003; Grubert, 2003).1
Several (high-tax) countries have implemented transfer pricing legislations dur-
ing the last decade which require MNEs to document their intra-firm transfer prices
for tax purposes. The strictness of these legislations vary across countries, ranging
from a mere acknowledgement that price setting must adhere to the arm’s length
principle (i.e. intra-firm prices must correspond to prices that would have been set
between third parties) up to strict legal requirements for transfer price documenta-
tion that have to be submitted with the tax return on an obligatory basis. A major
shortcoming of the stricter versions of transfer pricing rules is that they imply con-
siderable administrative costs for both, firms and tax authorities. Whether their
use is beneficial from a social perspective thus largely depends on whether they are
indeed instrumental in dampening earnings stripping from high-tax economies.
To assess this question, we collected detailed information on the transfer pricing
requirements in 26 European countries over the past decade (see also Lohse, Riedel,
and Spengel (2012) for details). This data is then merged with information on
corporate tax rates and rich accounting and ownership data on European MNEs
between 1999 and 2009.
1A second shifting channel which has attracted interest by academics and policy makers is
international debt shifting. Debt shifting strategies imply that affiliates in low-tax countries provide
loans to high-tax entities within the multinational group. The associated interest payment is
deductible from the corporate tax base at the high-tax entity and accrues with the low-tax affiliate.
Buettner and Wamser (2007) find evidence that MNEs engage in significant debt shifting activities
but the estimated effects are quantitatively small in size.
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In a first step, we exploit this data to replicate existing evidence on multinational
profit shifting behaviour. Precisely, we follow previous studies and determine the
impact of corporate tax rate changes on the reported profitability of multinational
affiliates using panel data estimations that control for unobserved affiliate hetero-
geneity and for time-varying firm, industry and host-country characteristics. In line
with previous evidence, we find a negative correlation between the host country’s
corporate tax rates and firm profitability. Quantitatively, our estimates suggest
that an increase in the corporate tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces corporate
pre-tax profitability by around 3.9%. The findings moreover also indicate that the
sensitivity of pre-tax profits to corporate tax rate changes has significantly decreased
over the last decade.
Using these estimates as a starting point, we in a second step assess the relation
between tax-motivated income relocations and the implementation of transfer pric-
ing legislations. For this purpose, we define three transfer pricing categories that
reflect the existence and strictness of a country’s transfer pricing legislations: the
first category comprises countries without transfer pricing legislations or with very
general anti-avoidance rules only; the second comprises countries in which transfer
pricing regulations do exist in practice and where tax authorities may require some
form of transfer price documentation while the transfer price legislations are not
implemented in national tax law; the third category comprises countries in which
documentation requirements are introduced into national tax law and imply that
firms must disclose their transfer pricing choices to the tax authorities upon request
or directly with the annual tax return.
Our empirical analysis suggests that transfer pricing legislations significantly
dampen multinational income shifting strategies as measured by the sensitivity of
corporate pre-tax profits to changes in the corporate tax rate. Compared to coun-
tries without transfer pricing legislations (category 1), introducing transfer price
regulations is found to reduce profit shifting activities substantially. The implemen-
tation of transfer pricing regimes of category 2 dampens profit shifting activities by
around 60%, the introduction of regimes of category 3 induces an even larger decline
in shifting activities by around 85%.
This qualitative and quantitative result is robust against a number of sensitivity
checks, including the reliance on alternative definitions for the strictness of transfer
pricing legislations, the use of alternative measures for the profitability of affiliate
activities and the modelling of transfer pricing incentives via the corporate tax
rate differential to other affiliates within the multinational corporate group rather
than the host country’s corporate tax rate. On top, we augment our estimations by
another characteristic of transfer pricing regimes which is the possibility to enter into
advance pricing agreements (APA) where tax authorities and firms agree on transfer
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prices for goods traded within the firm on an upfront basis. APAs thus mainly serve
as a device to reduce corporate risk related to later transfer price adjustments. One
may thus expect that MNEs are willing to give up after-tax profits to buy this
type of insurance and accept more conservative transfer prices and, consequently, a
reduction in tax savings through transfer price distortions instead. While we find
some evidence in line with this hypothesis, the pattern does not turn out to be stable
across specifications.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the recent public finance literature.
First, we add to the large and growing literature on international profit shifting.
Similar to our approach, most papers provide indirect evidence on multinational
shifting behaviour by establishing a significantly negative effect of the affiliates’
host country tax on the reported pre-tax profitability of firms (see e.g. Grubert and
Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994), Huizinga and Laeven (2008), and Weichen-
rieder (2009)). Some studies moreover assess the importance of individual income
shifting channels. Clausing (2003) provides evidence in favor of tax-motivated trans-
fer price distortions using data on intra-firm trade prices of US multinationals (see
also Swenson (2001) and Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) for related studies). Sev-
eral papers moreover show that intangible assets play an important role in profit
shifting strategies as for them arm’s length prices from third-party trade are hardly
available due to their firm-specific nature (see e.g. Grubert (1998), Grubert (2003),
and Dischinger and Riedel (2011)). Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008), Alt-
shuler and Grubert (2003) and Buettner and Wamser (2007) moreover determine
the effect of corporate taxation on the multinational’s debt-equity structure pro-
viding evidence in favour of tax-motivated debt-shifting. The evolution of profit
shifting behaviour over time has in turn received less attention. The only paper
we are aware of which tackles that issue is Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon (2001)
who show that between 1984 and 1992 US multinationals have increased their out-
ward profit shifting. Our evidence in turn suggests the reverse trend for later years
starting in 1999.
While profit shifting strategies are in general well-documented, the literature is
largely silent on the effectiveness of legislations which aim to restrict international
income shifting to low-tax countries. Exceptions are Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber,
and Wamser (2012) and Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012). Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber,
and Wamser (2012) provide evidence that thin capitalization rules which restrict the
deductibility of interest payments (for intra-firm debt) from the corporate tax base
indeed dampen multinational debt shifting behaviour. Similarly, Ruf and Weichen-
rieder (2012) report evidence that controlled foreign company (CFC)-regulations are
effective in reducing the attractiveness of passive investment in low-tax jurisdictions.
Our paper complements these studies by showing that transfer pricing legislations
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equally hamper the relocation of multinational income towards low-tax countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a simple theoret-
ical model to motivate our estimation strategy. Section 3 describes the construction
of the variables of main interest which are the corporate tax rate and the country’s
transfer pricing legislation rules and presents the company data and other country
control variables. Section 4 describes the estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the
results and Section 6 concludes.
2 A Simple Theoretical Model
Consider a representative multinational group with two affiliates in countries A and
B. Both firms produce an output si with i  {A,B}. For simplicity reasons, the price
for the final output good is normalized to 1. Moreover, we presume that affiliate A
produces an input good that is required for production by both affiliates and is sold
to affiliate B. The true price for this input good is q¯. Following previous papers, we
assume that the true transfer price is unobservable to the tax authorities and the
MNE can thus choose a transfer price which deviates from the true price.
Distorting the transfer price from its true price is not costless though. Following
Haufler and Schjelderup (2000), we assume that the MNE accrues positive costs
denoted by C if the transfer price is deviated from q¯, whereas the costs convexly
increase in the absolute deviation. This may either reflect that the probability for
the tax authorities to detect price distortions convexly increases in the deviation
from the true price. Alternatively, the MNE may incur convex concealment costs as
it may find it increasingly difficult to cover transfer pricing activities from the tax
authorities the further the price is deviated from its true price. Plausibly, trans-
fer pricing costs are moreover determined by the country’s level of transfer price
documentation requirements. If tax authorities for example require firms to doc-
ument and justify transfer prices in their common tax returns, the firm’s ability
to deviate the transfer price from the true price is presumed to be significantly re-
stricted. Formally, the transfer pricing costs are thus modelled as a u-shaped cost
function with a local minimum at q¯: C = γK(q − q¯), whereas γ > 0 and K(q¯) = 0,
sign(K ′) = sign(q − q¯) and K ′′ > 0.2 The strictness of the country’s transfer pric-
ing requirements are reflected by the parameter γ which increases the absolute and
marginal shifting costs for all q.3
2We assume that the parent is located in a country which fully exempts foreign profits.
3Note that we assumed a simple modelling strategy to implement transfer pricing legislations
into the costs functions, essentially assuming that they increase the firm’s detection risk and hence
proportionally raise the MNE’s cost function. Note that our results are robust to more complex
formulations of the cost function.
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The MNE’s after-tax profit reads
pi = (1− ta)(sa − q) + (1− tb)(sb + q)− C (1)
The MNE maximizes the after-tax profit in (1) by choosing the optimal transfer
price q. The first order condition reads
ta − tb = γK ′(q − q¯) (2)
The optimal transfer pricing choice thus equates marginal shifting costs (right hand
side of equation (2)) and marginal benefits from shifting activities (left hand side
of equation (2)). Thus, if ta > tb, the MNE chooses a transfer price q > q¯ and
thus relocates income from country A to country B by overpricing the input good
delivered from affiliate A to affiliate B. Analogously, if tb > ta, the MNE chooses
a transfer price q < q¯ and thus relocates income from country B to country A by
underpricing the input good delivered from affiliate A to affiliate B.
Comparative statics read
dq
d(ta − tb) =
1
γK ′′
,
dq
dγ
= − K
′
γK ′′
,
d2q
d(ta − tb)dγ = −
1
γ2K ′′
.
Thus, profit shifting incentives imply that the optimal transfer price q increases
in the tax rate differential between countries A and B. Moreover, transfer price
distortions are reduced if transfer price documentation requirements, as modelled
by the parameter γ, rise. Formally, sign( dq
dγ
) = −signK ′. For the same reason, the
marginal effect of changes in the tax rate difference on the transfer price choice is
dampened with rising documentation requirements γ.
The model thus predicts that transfer price documentation lowers the MNE’s
incentive to engage in income shifting behaviour and dampens the sensitivity of
transfer prices (and in consequence reported pre-tax profits) to changes in the cor-
porate tax rate.
3 Data
We assess this hypothesis using firm level data on multinational affiliates in the
EU. The data is taken from the firm database AMADEUS (version February 2011)
provided by the Bureau van Dijk. It includes rich information on accounting and
financial data which comprises balance sheets, profit & loss accounts and several
financial indicators. Data is available in panel format for the years 1999 to 2009 and
includes firms in 26 European countries. The firms included in our analysis belong
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to a multinational group in the sense that either their parent company or one of
their wholly owned subsidiaries is located in a foreign economy. As Bureau von Dijk
draws on different sources of information across countries, sample coverage varies
and thus some caution is warranted when drawing conclusions from our results for
the population of firms. A country distribution of our sample affiliates is presented
in Table 1.
The observational unit in our analysis is the multinational affiliate per year. In
total, our sample comprises 151,716 observations from 32,508 affiliates for the years
1999 to 2009. Hence, we observe each affiliate for 4.7 years on average. Besides the
rich set of accounting information available in AMADEUS, we enlarge our dataset
by merging information on the country’s tax system, i.e. the statutory corporate tax
rates and information on transfer pricing legislations. The corporate tax information
is taken from Ernst & Young’s worldwide corporate tax guide, while we collected
the information on transfer pricing regulations from various sources, mainly transfer
pricing guides published by Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PwC. In the
following, we will briefly sketch the development of corporate tax rates and transfer
pricing rules in our sample countries over time and describe how this information is
classified and exploited for our empirical analysis.
In general, transfer pricing regulations vary across countries and may differ in a
number of characteristics, most importantly in their applicability and scope, in the
allowed methods for transfer price calculation, in the documentation requirements,
or penalties for non-compliance with the rules.
In the following, we will classify countries in three categories reflecting the strict-
ness of their transfer pricing legislations. A first natural step is to assess whether
a country has enacted any form of transfer price legislation at all. Transfer pric-
ing rules are commonly based on the so called arm’s length principle which requires
that prices for intercompany transactions have to correspond to the price that would
have been chosen between two unrelated parties. While most European countries
have implemented arm’s length principles in their national tax law, the legislation
is often imprecise and does not include further details as to its applicability, the
determination of transfer prices, or the required documentation and hence lacks in
scope to restrict transfer pricing behaviour. Countries without or with only limited
transfer pricing legislations are hence assigned to our first transfer pricing category.
In the next step, we identify differences in the strictness of existing transfer pric-
ing legislation. The major instrument to limit transfer pricing opportunities is the
introduction of documentation requirements for controlled transactions and prices
as the increased level of transparency reduces the scope for deviations of the transfer
pricing choice from the ’true’ price. The importance of transfer pricing requirements
is underpinned by the fact that in most jurisdictions the burden of proof as to the
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appropriateness of a transfer price switches from the tax authorities to the taxpayer
if only insufficient documentation is available. The introduction of documentation
requirements into national tax law is furthermore in general accompanied by special
transfer pricing penalties on missing or wrong documentation. Jurisdictions, how-
ever, differ in the stage at which the transfer price documentation must be made
available to the tax authorities. While some jurisdictions require the documenta-
tion only in case of a formal audit, others require the documentation to be available
upfront to answer requests by the tax authority or hand it in with the tax return.
In the following, we will classify the former countries in category 2 and the latter
countries in category 3. An overview of the categories can be found in Tables 2A
and 2B (for a more detailed study on the different transfer pricing regulations see
Lohse, Riedel, and Spengel (2012)).4
Note that the definition of the above categories abstracts from issues related to
the calculation methodology for intra-firm transfer prices as there is little variation
in the allowed pricing methods across countries and different methods are not con-
sidered to imply more or less leeway in the transfer pricing choice.5 We furthermore
abstract from general and special penalties for transfer price adjustments as we
were not able to find reliable information on (changes in) the design of such penal-
ties (over time). But our research revealed that special transfer pricing penalties
are in almost all cases introduced together with the implementation of documen-
tation requirements in national tax law. We, therefore, believe that our measure
for the strictness of transfer pricing regulations also reflects that documentation
requirements are enforced by penalties.
In all our sample countries, transfer pricing regulations have been either intro-
duced or tightened between 1999 and 2009. Not a single country has relaxed its
regulations. While in the first year of their inclusion in the sample, the great ma-
jority of countries was allocated to category 2 (16 countries), and only six countries
were allocated to category 1 and four countries to category 3, in the last year of the
sample, the majority of countries moved up to category 3 (15 countries), while only
two countries remained in category 1 and nine in category 2.
4Note that the detection risk of transfer pricing activities likely differs across asset types. For
instance the transfer of an intangible asset, where no market of comparable goods exists, are more
difficult to assess and offer a greater scope for manipulation than other types of assets. This
difference, however, is not specific to any particular country but plausibly holds for all economies
within our sample.
5Countries have formulated regulations on how to determine transfer prices depending on the
type of transaction. In most cases, such rules are based on the OECD transfer pricing guidelines.
The available methods either follow an opportunity cost approach that determines arm’s length
prices considering prices or profit margins of comparable uncontrolled transactions or they make
use of benchmark analyses of competitors. The methods available may lead to different ranges of
possible transfer prices. Which method is best suited from the viewpoint of the company to distort
transfer prices from the ’true’ price thus very much depends on the specific situation and the type
of transaction. No general proposition can be made about the generocity of a certain method.
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Furthermore, we augmented our data by another aspect of transfer pricing regimes
which is the possibility to enter into an advance pricing agreement (APA). Such an
agreement allows tax payers and tax authorities to negotiate a transfer price for a
certain transaction in advance and for a certain period of time. It, therefore, signif-
icantly reduces the risk of a transfer pricing adjustment. APAs are generally offered
in different forms, they can either be unilateral or bilateral. A unilateral agreement
is entered by the taxpayer and the national tax authority of the hosting country,
while a bilateral agreement also includes the tax authority of a foreign country which
is affected by the transaction. Therefore, bilateral agreements are generally more
favourable for taxpayers as transfer prices are approved by both affected countries.
None of the countries considered in this study offered bilateral advance pricing agree-
ments in 1999, but this changed substantially over our sample period. In 2009, ten
countries had started offering APA procedures (see Table 2C in the Appendix).
Moreover, we augment our data set by information on various host country con-
trol variables, precisely, GDP as a proxy for market size, GDP per capita as a proxy
for a country’s income and development level, the GDP growth rate as a measure
for economic growth, the unemployment rate as a proxy for the state of a country’s
economy and the corruption index as a proxy for the state of governance institu-
tions. The corruption index is obtained from Transparency International while other
country data is retrieved from the World Development Indicator Database. For an
overview of the descriptive statistics see Table 3.
4 Estimation Strategy
We estimate a model of the following form
EBITit = β0 + β1τit + β2(τit · TPit) + β3TPit + β4Xit + ρt + φi + it (3)
where EBITit depicts the earnings before interest and taxes of affiliate i at time
t. As the distribution of the variable is strongly skewed, we use a logarithmic
transformation of the variable.
The regressors of main interest are the corporate tax rate, denoted by τit, and
the variable indicating the strictness of a country’s transfer pricing regulations (as
defined in the previous section) denoted by TPit. Following previous papers, we
test for international profit shifting activities by regressing the affiliate’s earnings
before interest and taxes (EBIT) on the host country’s corporate tax rate. If MNEs
engage in significant income shifting behaviour, we presume that a high corporate
tax rate dampens the reported earnings and vice versa, expecting β1 < 0. But
at the same time, we suppose that profit shifting activities and hence the sensi-
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tivity of a company’s reported pre-tax earnings with respect to corporate tax rate
changes is influenced by transfer pricing legislation. We, therefore, expect the tax
rate sensitivity of profit shifting for European multinationals to decrease with the
introduction or tightening of transfer pricing legislations. Regarding the interaction
of the corporate tax rate and TPit we expect a positive coefficient β2 > 0 since
reported pre-tax profits are supposed to increase due to less profit shifting activity.
The coefficient estimate β3 captures the effect of stricter transfer price legislations
on EBIT in countries with a corporate tax rate of zero. Here, the sign of the coeffi-
cient estimate is expected to be negative as tax haven countries are, in the absence
of transfer pricing legislations, expected to be at the receiving end of profit shifting
relations implying high reported earnings. If tax haven countries in turn introduce
transfer price documentation requirements (the result of which may in the course of
disputes also become accessible to authorities in high-tax countries), profit shifting
opportunities are likely dampened, inducing the reported level of the EBIT to fall.
Furthermore, the estimations are augmented by a large set of control variables
Xit. Most importantly, we control for affiliate size as measured by a company’s
fixed asset stock and costs of employees. Moreover, we include a set of time-varying
country controls comprising the country’s GDP (to proxy for country size), GDP per
capita (to proxy for the country’s level of development), the GDP growth rate (as a
measure for economic growth), the unemployment rate (as a proxy for the economic
state of the country) and a corruption index (to proxy for the governance situation
in a country). Additionally we include a full set of affiliate fixed effects to absorb
any time-constant differences between the entities. All specifications furthermore
include a full set of one-digit industry-year effects which capture common shocks to
all affiliates within the same industry over time.
5 Results
The results are presented in the following subsections. In Section 5.1, we present the
findings of our baseline specifications. A number of robustness checks are discussed
in Section 5.2.
5.1 Basic Results
The baseline results are presented in Table 4. Following the estimation strategy
specified in equation (4), the dependent variable is the logarithm of corporate oper-
ating profits before taxes as measured by earnings before interest and tax (EBIT).
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which account for clustering at the firm
level (columns (a)), the country-year level (columns (b)) and the industry level
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(columns (c)) are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
In Specification (1), we regress the logarithm of EBIT on the statutory corpo-
rate tax rate and the full set of control variables specified in Section 4 (firm fixed
effects, year fixed effects, industry-year fixed effects as well as time-varying firm
and host country characteristics). In line with previous studies, the estimate for
the corporate tax rate turns out negative, indicating a negative impact of corporate
tax increases on the reported profitability of corporate operating activities. The
coefficient estimate is moreover statistically significant at conventional significance
levels irrespective of the level of clustering (see the standard errors reported in sub-
columns (a), (b) and (c)). Quantitatively, the results suggest that an increase of the
corporate tax rate by 10 percentage point decreases reported profits before tax by
3.94%.
In Specification (2), we augment the set of regressors by an interaction term
between the affiliate’s host country corporate tax rate and a linear time trend,
allowing for the possibility that profit shifting activities have systematically changed
over time. The findings indicate that the sensitivity of operating profits to corporate
tax rate changes has significantly decreased over our sample period. The linear
framework suggests an annual decline in the semi-elasticity by 0.18, implying that, in
1999, an increase in the corporate tax rate by 1 percentage points led to a substantial
drop in operating income by 1.9%, while, in 2009, the effect shrank to a small 0.1,
indicating that an increase in the corporate tax rate by 1 percentage points decreased
operating income by 0.1% only.
Following our estimation model in equation (4), Specification (3) furthermore
includes an additional regressor indicating whether the affiliate’s host country has
implemented binding transfer pricing legislations (the variable takes on the value
1 if the country has implemented transfer price legislations as defined in categories
2 or 3 in a given year, see Section 3 for details), as well as its interaction term
with the corporate tax rate. The results suggest that the implementation of bind-
ing transfer pricing legislations reduces profit shifting activities significantly. The
coefficient estimate for the corporate tax variable again turns out statistically signif-
icant, indicating that, in 1999, an increase in the host country’s corporate tax rate
by 1 percentage point led to a decrease in operating profits by 3.4%. The positive
coefficient estimate for the interaction between the corporate tax variable and the
linear time trend confirms the previous finding that income shifting activities have
quantitatively reduced during our sample period. Note that the relative quantita-
tive decrease turns out substantially smaller than in the previous estimate though,
suggesting a semi-elasticity of EBIT with respect to the corporate tax rate of 1.58,
indicating that an increase in the corporate tax rate by 1 percentage point dampens
reported EBIT by 1.6%.
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The coefficient estimate for the interaction term between the corporate tax rate
and the variable indicating the implementation of transfer pricing legislations is
positive and quantitatively large. It moreover turns out statistically significant if
we account for clustering at the firm, industry and country-year level respectively.
It suggests that the implementation of transfer pricing legislations is instrumental
in limiting income shifting activities as measured by the sensitivity of operating
income with respect to corporate tax rate changes. Quantitatively, income shifting
activities are found to be reduced by around 50% (= 1.709/(−3.425)). As presumed,
the coefficient estimate for the transfer pricing indicator variable moreover turns out
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the implementation of transfer
pricing rules in a low-tax country levying a zero corporate tax rate reduces the
affiliate’s operating profitability as the legislations may restrict the multinational
group’s ability to shifting income towards the low-tax affiliate.
Note, furthermore, that in all specifications, the control variables show the ex-
pected signs. Firm size, measured by the logarithm of fixed assets and the logarithm
of costs of employees, exerts a positive impact on reported EBIT. With increasing
unemployment rates, the reported earnings before interest and taxes decrease, while
they increase with an increasing GDP per capita and an increasing GDP growth
rate. The coefficient for the GDP variable has a negative sign which may reflect
that competition levels rise in larger markets and therefore drive down firm prof-
itability.
5.2 Robustness Checks
To assess the sensitivity of our results to alternative model specifications, we ran a
number of robustness checks. For all robustness checks, we report heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters.
Specification (1) of Table 5 resembles the baseline specification in Column (3)
of Table 4. Specification (2) reestimates this baseline model but includes a contin-
uous measure for the transfer price legislation which takes on the values 1 to 3 for
the transfer price categories defined in Section 3. The findings again resemble our
baseline estimates by suggesting that increasing the strictness of transfer price leg-
islation by one category reduces the elasticity of the sensitivity of operating profits
to corporate tax rate changes by 1.1, or, in relative terms, by around one third.
Specification (3) furthermore models the transfer price legislation system by includ-
ing indicator variables for categories 2 and 3 as well as their interaction terms with
the corporate tax rate variable. This, again, confirms the previous results in the
sense that we find a negative and quantitatively large coefficient estimate for the
corporate tax rate variable, which suggests substantial profit shifting activities in the
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absence of transfer price legislations (category 1). The negative tax effect is damp-
ened, however, if the affiliate’s host country has implemented transfer pricing leg-
islations. Introducing legislations of category 2, dampens the sensitivity by around
61% (= 1.789/(−2.942)) relative to category 1. Introducing legislations of category
3, dampens the effect by around 85% relative to category 1 (= 2.494/(−2.942)).
Specifications (4) to (6) furthermore reestimate the models in Columns (1) to (3)
but employ EBIT over total assets as dependent variable to capture corporate prof-
itability. This leaves the qualitative pattern of the results unaltered. Quantita-
tively, the dampening effect of transfer pricing legislation on shifting behavior is
somewhat smaller than in the baseline results. Column (6) for example suggests
that introducing transfer price legislations of category 2, dampens the profit sen-
sitivity to corporate tax rate changes by around 35% (= 1.250/(−3.560)) relative
to category 1. Introducing legislations of category 3, dampens the effect by 53%
(= 1.886/(−3.560)) relative to category 1.
So far, all estimation models furthermore employed profit information as mea-
sured by EBIT which captures the firm’s operating profits before interest and tax.
From our point of view, it the best suited profit measure in the context of our
analysis since transfer price distortions for goods and services traded within the
multinational group are expected to affect a company’s operating income in first
place. However, financial profits may also be affected by transfer pricing regulations
since transfer price legislations also require interest rates to be set according to the
arm’s length principle. We thus, as a robustness check, rerun our baseline estima-
tions using corporate pre-tax profits as dependent variable which comprises both,
the company’s operating as well as its financial profit. The results are presented
in Table 6. Specifications (1) to (3) reestimate the models in Columns (1) to (3)
of Table 5 but employ pre-tax profits instead of EBIT as the dependent variable.
The qualitative pattern of the results remains the same, while the dampening ef-
fect of transfer pricing legislations on profit shifting behavior, again, is found to be
somewhat smaller than in the baseline estimates. Precisely, the results in Column
(3) suggest that introducing transfer price legislations of category 2 (category 3),
dampens the profit sensitivity to corporate tax rate changes by around 38% (63%)
relative to category 1. Using pre-tax profit over total assets as the dependent vari-
able reduces the dampening effect even further, see Columns (4) to (6). Column (6)
suggests that introducing transfer price legislations of category 2 (category 3), re-
duces the profit sensitivity to corporate tax rate choices by only 19% (39%) relative
to category 1. This pattern is in line with intuition since arm’s length prices for fi-
nancial transactions are readily available and shifting possibility for financial income
through the distortion of interest rate choices thus appear to be limited (contrary
to the intra-firm trade of firm specific goods and services).
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As described in Section 3, we furthermore augmented our data by information
on advanced pricing agreements (APAs). The possibility to enter into an advanced
pricing agreement and to negotiate intra-firm transfer prices with the tax authorities
on an upfront basis, is expected to reduce the company’s risk for later transfer
price adjustments in the course of tax audits. Multinational corporations may thus
be willing to give up after-tax income and agree on less aggressive transfer prices
which imply less income relocation to low-tax countries. If this held true, we would
expect that the possibility to enter bilateral advanced pricing agreements reduced
the sensitivity of reported operating profits to corporate tax rate changes. We
estimate a model of the following form
EBITit = α0 + α1τit + α2(τit · TPit) + α3TPit + α4(τit · APAit) + α5APAit
+α6Xit + ρt + φi + it (4)
whereas the variable definition corresponds to equation (4) and APAit indicates that
the tax authorities in affiliate i’s host country allow for advanced pricing agreements
in period t. If advanced pricing agreements indeed dampen income shifting activities,
we expect α4 > 0. The sign of the coefficient estimate for the APAit variable in turn
is expected to be negative (α5 < 0) since giving up income shifting opportunities in
a low-tax country would imply a reduction in pre-tax profitability.
The results are depicted in Table 7. In Columns (1), we reestimate the model
presented in Column (3) of Table 4, augmenting the set of regressors by an indica-
tor for the opportunity to engage in advanced pricing agreements and its interaction
term with the corporate tax rate. The results in Column (1) confirm our basic hy-
pothesis. The coefficient estimate for the interaction between the advanced pricing
variable and the corporate tax rate turns out positive and statistically significant,
indicating that advanced pricing agreements reduce income shifting activities. More-
over, as expected, the coefficient estimate for the advanced pricing variable turns out
negative and significant. Moreover, our baseline results on the effect of transfer pric-
ing legislations on income shifting activities remain qualitatively and quantitatively
unaffected by the inclusion of the new regressors.
The finding does not turn out to be robust across specifications though. Mod-
elling the strictness of transfer pricing legislations through indicator variables for the
categories 2 and 3 renders the coefficient estimate for the interaction term between
the advanced pricing variable and the corporate tax rate statistically insignificant
(although it remains positive and only slightly drops in size). If we reestimate
the two specifications employing EBIT over total assets as dependent variable in
Columns (3) and (4), the latter finding is confirmed. Thus, while the availability of
advanced pricing agreements does not appear to have a robust negative impact on
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the dimension of tax-motivated income shifting activities, the dampening effect of
transfer pricing legislations is confirmed by all model specifications.
Finally, note that our analysis so far has relied on information on the statutory
corporate tax rate in the affiliate’s host country to model income shifting incentives.
As shown in the sketched theoretical model in Section 2 income shifting incentives
are plausibly determined by the corporate tax rate difference between the entities
of a multinational corporation. We thus reestimate our baseline specifications using
the tax rate differential between the considered affiliate and all other affiliate within
the multinational group. The tax differential is calculated by determining the un-
weighted average tax rate of all corporate group members (ownership >50%) of the
firm and deducting it from the corporate tax rate in the firm’s host country.
The results are reported in Table 8. Specification (1) regresses the affiliate’s
EBIT on the corporate tax rate differential as well as its interaction term with a
linear time trend and a dummy variable indicating the presence of transfer price
legislations (categories 2 and 3). Analogously to the previous specifications, the set
of control variables described in Section 4 is included in the model. In line with
expectations, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate for
the tax difference variable, indicating that an increase in the tax rate differential
between the considered entity and other affiliates within the multinational group
increases the multinational’s incentive to relocate income away from the affiliate.
The coefficient estimate for the interaction between the corporate tax rate variable
and the indicator for transfer pricing rules turns out positive and statistically sig-
nificant in turn, suggesting that the income shifting effect is significantly dampned
by transfer pricing legislations. Quantitatively, the findings suggest a reduction in
shifting activities through the implementation of transfer pricing rules by around
74%.6
The pattern of these results prevails when we model transfer price legislations
by including dummy variables which indicate transfer pricing regimes of category 2
and 3 in Specification (2) and augment the specification by information on advanced
pricing agreements and their interaction term with the corporate tax rate in Spec-
ification (3). As before, advanced pricing agreements are not found to significantly
affect shifting behavior. These results are further confirmed when we reestimate
6Interestingly, the coefficient for the transfer pricing variable is now positive as well. This might
appear surprising at first sight. Note, however, that the transfer pricing variable now reflects the
impact of the introduction of transfer pricing legislations on reported operating profits for affiliates
which exhibit a corporate tax rate differential of zero relative to other affiliates in the multinational
group (as compared to a corporate tax rate of zero in the previous estimations). The coefficient
thus does no longer capture the impact of the introduction of transfer pricing regulations in low-
tax countries, but in ’middle-tax’ countries with comparable corporate tax rates as other firms in
the multinational group. For this reference group, the introduction of transfer pricing legislations
appears to exert a positive impact on reported EBIT.
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the specifications, employing EBIT over total assets as the dependent variable (see
Specifications (4) to (6)).
Summarizing, our findings suggest that transfer pricing legislations are instru-
mental in limiting income shifting activities, while advanced pricing agreements do
not reveal a stable negative impact on shifting behavior.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to investigate multinational profit shifting within Eu-
rope and to assess whether international shifting is significantly dampened by the
introduction and tightening of transfer price documentation requirements. As trans-
fer pricing is widely acknowledged to be an (perhaps the most) important income
shifting channel (see e.g. Clausing (2003) and Buettner and Wamser (2007)), many
countries have implemented transfer pricing documentation requirements in recent
years to hedge against profit outflows through intra-firm price distortions. As these
rules, especially the stricter versions, give rise to significant compliance costs for
multinational firms and bind valuable resources within tax authorities, evaluating
their effectiveness in restricting transfer pricing behaviour by MNEs is crucial to
assess their welfare implications.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to assess the link between
transfer price documentation and multinational income shifting behaviour. For that
purpose, we collected information on transfer price legislations in 26 European coun-
tries over the past decade and linked it to panel data on multinational firms in the
EU. In line with previous studies, we find evidence for multinational profit shifting
from high-tax to low-tax countries. These shifting activities, however, turn out to be
reduced significantly when countries introduce transfer pricing regulations. Depend-
ing on the model specification, our findings suggest that transfer pricing legislations
may reduce income shifting behavior by more than 50%, whereas stricter rules also
tend to imply stronger negative effects on shifting behavior.
The results thus suggest that the high administrative burden associated with
transfer pricing regulations may be justified as they lead to a strong decline in
tax-motivated profit shifting activities across borders.
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8 Appendix
Table 1: Country Statistics
Country Firm Number
Austria 300
Belgium 2,187
Bulgaria 633
Croatia 365
Czech Republic 551
Denmark 1,771
Estonia 282
Finland 544
France 3,001
Germany 1,510
Hungary 34
Ireland 33
Italy 2,348
Latvia 8
Luxembourg 18
Netherlands 2,196
Norway 1,101
Poland 934
Portugal 337
Romania 4,735
Slovak Republic 78
Spain 2,803
Sweden 2,127
Switzerland 136
Ukraine 133
United Kingdom 4,343
Sum 32,508
Table 2A: Categorization of Transfer Pricing Regulations
Category Description
Category 1 No or only very general anti-avoidance regulations; no
documentation requirements
Category 2 Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement is
not introduced in national tax law, but is required to
exist in an audit
Category 3 Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement
exists in national tax law
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Table 2B: Transfer Pricing Categories
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Austria . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . 2
Croatia 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . . 3
Czech Republic . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Denmark . . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Estonia . . . . . . . . 3 3 3
Finland . . . . 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
France . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Germany . . 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Hungary . . 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Ireland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Italy . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Latvia . . . . . . . . 2 2 2
Luxembourg . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 2
Netherlands 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Norway . . . . . 2 2 2 2 3 3
Poland . . 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Portugal 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Romania . . . . 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
Slovak Republic . . . . . . 2 2 2 2 3
Spain . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
Sweden . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
Switzerland . . 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
United Kingdom 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
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Table 2C: Possibility to enter into a bilateral advance pricing agreement
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Slovak Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Spain . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . .
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Earnings Before Interest 150,214 17,086.5 255,592.8 0.0011 3.54e+07
and Taxes (EBIT)F
Pre-tax ProfitsF 151,716 21,565.42 272,660 0.0004 3.45e+07
Earnings Before Interest and 150,214 0.1277 0.2075 1.41e-06 22.9051
Taxes over Total AssetsF
Pre-tax Profits over 151,716 0.1380 2.0007 1.62e-06 764.946
Total AssetsF
Fixed AssetsF 151,716 181,206.8 2,207,504 0.0014 2.36e+08
Costs of EmployeesF 151,716 27,373.47 222,174.1 0.0003 2.26e+07
Corporate Tax Rate 151,716 0.3019 0.0627 0.1 0.4025
Tax DifferentialH 87,152 0.0097 0.0626 -0.303 0.314
Existence of Transfer 151,716 0.9596 0.1970 0 1
Pricing Legislation
Transfer Pricing Legislation 151,716 2.3863 0.5639 1 3
Category 1 151,716 0.0404 0.1970 0 1
Category 2 151,716 0.5329 0.4989 0 1
Category 3 151,716 0.4267 0.4946 0 1
APA 146,321 0.5243 0.4994 0 1
GDP per CapitaN 151,716 20,688.4 9,660.09 594 56,600
GDPN 151,716 7.40e+11 6.42e+11 8.19e+09 2.1e+12
GDP growth rate 151,716 2.1978 3.0162 -18 12.1
Corruption Index 151,716 6.9147 1.9872 1.5 9.7
Unemployment 151,716 7.3699 2.9651 2.1 20.5
Notes: Firm data is exported from AMADEUS database offered by Bureau van Dijk, version: February 2011
F taken from unconsolidated accounts, in thousand USD
H difference between the host country’s corporate tax rate and the unweighted average tax rate of the corporate
group (ownership ¿50%)
N in USD, constant prices, year 2000 (Source: World Development Indicator Database, World Bank)
 in % (Source: World Development Indicator Database, World Bank)
 index ranges from 1 (high level of corruption) to 10 (no corruption) (Source: Transparency International)
 in % of total labor force (Source: World Development Indicator Database, World Bank)
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Table 5: Robustness Checks: Different Profitability Measures, Fixed Effects, Panel 1999-2009
Dependent Variable: Log EBIT (Columns (1)-(3)), Log EBIT/Total Assets (Columns (4)-(6))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corporate Tax Rate -3.425∗∗∗ -3.339∗∗∗ -2.942∗∗∗ -4.018∗∗∗ -4.246∗∗∗ -3.560∗∗∗
(0.409) (0.377) (0.412) (0.397) (0.359) (0.400)
Corporate Tax Rate × 0.185∗∗∗ 0.069∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
Time (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035)
TP Legislation Binary -0.468∗∗∗ -0.219∗
(0.124) (0.121)
TP Legislation Binary × 1.709∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗∗
Corporate Tax Rate (0.363) (0.354)
TP Legislation Continuous -0.327∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.044)
TP Legislation Continuous × 1.058∗∗∗ 0.977∗∗∗
Corporate Tax Rate (0.145) (0.138)
Category 2 -0.478∗∗∗ -0.230∗
(0.124) (0.121)
Category 3 -0.737∗∗∗ -0.472∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.131)
Category 2 × Corporate Tax Rate 1.789∗∗∗ 1.250∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.357)
Category 3 × Corporate Tax Rate 2.494∗∗∗ 1.886∗∗∗
(0.396) (0.383)
Fixed Assets 0.083∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Costs of Employees 0.437∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Corruption Index 0.005 0.012 0.014 -0.007 -0.004 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
GDP/1013 -0.095 -0.242∗ -0.189 -0.291∗∗ 0.106 0.198
(0.134) (0.134) (0.135) (0.128) (0.128) (0.129)
GDPpC/100 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP Growth Rate 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Unemployment -0.010∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Industry-Year-Effects
√ √ √ √ √ √
Within R-Squared 0.1578 0.1580 0.1582 0.0341 0.0341 0.0345
#Obs 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214 150,214
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Observational unit is the multinational firm, i.e. either the
parent or a wholly owned subsidiary is located in a foreign jurisdiction. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
the firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. ’Corporate tax rate’ depicts the host country’s statutory corporate tax
rate including local income taxes and possible surcharges. ’Corporate Tax Rate x Time’ stands for the interaction
term of the corporate tax rate and a time indicator (values 1 to 11 for the years 1999-2009). ’Existence of Transfer
Pricing Legislation’ describes an indicator variable for the existence of transfer pricing legislation in a given country.
’Existence of TP Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate’ stands for the interaction term of such an indicator variable and
the corporate tax rate. ’Transfer Pricing Legislation’ depicts the strictness of transfer pricing legislation (1= no
or only very general anti-avoidance regulations; 2= Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement is not
introduced in national tax law, but is required to exist in an audit; 3 = Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation
requirement exists in national tax law, but must only be available upon request). ’TP Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate’
describes the interaction term of the categorial transfer pricing variable and the corporate tax rate. ’Category 2’
and ’Category 3’ stand for indicator variables for categories 2 and 3 as defined above. ’Category 2 x Corporate
Tax Rate’ and ’Category 3 x Corporate Tax Rate’ describe the interaction term of the respective category and the
corporate tax rate. For a description of the control variables, see the notes to Table 4.
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Table 6: Robustness Checks: Different Profitability Measures, Fixed Effects, Panel 1999-2009
Dependent Variable: Log Profit Before Taxes (Columns (1)-(3)), Log Profit Before Taxes/Total Assets (Columns (4)-(6))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corporate Tax Rate -4.464∗∗∗ -4.705∗∗∗ -3.788∗∗∗ -5.104∗∗∗ -5.760∗∗∗ -4.430∗∗∗
(0.448) (0.410) (0.451) (0.436) (0.395) (0.440)
Corporate Tax Rate × Time 0.354∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.041) (0.041) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039)
TP Legislation Binary -0.355∗∗ -0.079
(0.139) (0.137)
TP Legislation Binary × 1.252∗∗ 0.628
Corporate Tax Rate (0.405) (0.398)
TP Legislation Continuous -0.405∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.048)
TP Legislation Continuous × 1.186∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗
Corporate Tax Rate (0.157) (0.151)
Category 2 -0.376∗∗∗ -0.101
(0.139) (0.137)
Category 3 -0.744∗∗∗ -0.468∗∗
(0.149) (0.146)
Category 2 × Corporate Tax Rate 1.451∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗
(0.409) (0.401)
Category 3 × Corporate Tax Rate 2.370∗∗∗ 1.741∗∗∗
(0.437) (0.426)
Costs of Employees 0.359∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Fixed Assets 0.083∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Corruption Index -0.013 -0.003 -0.001 -0.026∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.012
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
GDP -4.66e-13∗∗∗ -6.84e-13∗∗∗ -6.15e-13∗∗∗ -1.81e-14 1.67e-13 1.67e-13
(1.41e-13) (1.41e-13) (1.42e-13) (1.33e-13) (1.35e-13) (1.35e-13)
GDP per Capita 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
(8.72e-6) (8.72e-6) (8.71e-6) (8.30e-6) (8.29e-6) (8.29e-6)
GDP Growth Rate 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Unemployment -0.015∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Industry-Year-Effects
√ √ √ √ √ √
Within R-Squared 0.1425 0.1431 0.1432 0.0326 0.0330 0.0334
#Obs 151,716 151,716 151,716 151,716 151,716 151,716
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Observational unit is the multinational firm, i.e. either the
parent or a wholly owned subsidiary is located in a foreign jurisdiction. The dependent variable is the logarithm
of the firm’s profit before taxes. ’Corporate tax rate’ depicts the host country’s statutory corporate tax rate
including local income taxes and possible surcharges. ’Corporate Tax Rate x Time’ stands for the interaction term
of the corporate tax rate and a time indicator (values 1 to 11 for the years 1999-2009). ’Existence of Transfer
Pricing Legislation’ describes an indicator variable for the existence of transfer pricing legislation in a given country.
’Existence of TP Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate’ stands for the interaction term of such an indicator variable and
the corporate tax rate. ’Transfer Pricing Legislation’ depicts the strictness of transfer pricing legislation (1= no
or only very general anti-avoidance regulations; 2= Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement is not
introduced in national tax law, but is required to exist in an audit; 3 = Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation
requirement exists in national tax law, but must only be available upon request). ’TP Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate’
describes the interaction term of the categorial transfer pricing variable and the corporate tax rate. ’Category 2’
and ’Category 3’ stand for indicator variables for categories 2 and 3 as defined above. ’Category 2 x Corporate
Tax Rate’ and ’Category 3 x Corporate Tax Rate’ describe the interaction term of the respective category and the
corporate tax rate. For a description of the control variables, see the notes to Table 4.
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Table 7: Robustness Checks: Advance Pricing Agreements, Fixed Effects, Panel 1999-2009
Dependent Variable: Log EBIT (Columns (1)-(2)), Log EBIT/Total Assets (Columns (3)-(4))
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corporate Tax Rate -2.438∗∗∗ -2.401∗∗∗ -3.294∗∗ -3.228∗∗∗
(0.432) (0.431) (0.420) (0.419)
Corporate Tax Rate x Time 0.037 0.031 0.307∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038)
Existence of Transfer Pricing -0.466∗∗∗ -0.188
Legislation (0.125) (0.122)
Existence of TP Leg. x 1.673∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗
Corporate Tax Rate (0.368) (0.358)
Category 2 -0.459∗∗∗ -0.173
(0.126) (0.122)
Category 3 -0.528∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗
(0.142) (0.138)
Category 2 x Corporate Tax Rate 1.689∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗∗
(0.373) (0.363)
Category 3 x Corporate Tax Rate 1.837∗∗∗ 1.408∗∗∗
(0.417) (0.404)
APA -0.213∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗ -0.118∗∗ 0.016
(0.050) (0.073) (0.048) (0.070)
APA x Corporate Tax Rate 0.387∗∗ 0.231 0.020 -0.264
(0.175) (0.231) (0.167) (0.220)
Log Costs of Employees 0.431∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Log Fixed Assets 0.083∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Corruption Index -0.005 0.004 -0.010 -0.012∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
GDP 1.41e-13 1.09e-13 5.42e-13∗∗∗ 4.92e-13∗∗∗
(1.50e-13) (1.51e-13) (1.43e-13) (1.44e-13)
GDP per Capita 0.00007∗∗∗ 0.00007∗∗∗ 0.00009∗∗∗ 0.00009∗∗∗
(8.25e-6) (8.42e-6) (7.84e-6) (8.00e-6)
GDP Growth Rate 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Unemployment -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Industry-Year-Effects
√ √ √ √
Within R-Squared 0.1575 0.1575 0.0350 0.0351
#Obs 146,321 146,321 146,321 146,321
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Observational unit is the multinational firm, i.e. either the
parent or a wholly owned subsidiary is located in a foreign jurisdiction. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
the firm’s earnings before interest and taxes. ’Corporate tax rate’ depicts the host country’s statutory corporate tax
rate including local income taxes and possible surcharges. ’Corporate Tax Rate x Time’ stands for the interaction
term of the corporate tax rate and a time indicator (values 1 to 11 for the years 1999-2009). ’Existence of Transfer
Pricing Legislation’ describes an indicator variable for the existence of transfer pricing legislation in a given country.
’Existence of TP Leg. x Corporate Tax Rate’ stands for the interaction term of such an indicator variable and
the corporate tax rate. ’Category 2’ and ’Category 3’ stand for indicator variables for categories 2 and 3 (1= no
or only very general anti-avoidance regulations; 2= Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement is not
introduced in national tax law, but is required to exist in an audit; 3 = Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation
requirement exists in national tax law, but must only be available upon request). ’Category 2 x Corporate Tax
Rate’ and ’Category 3 x Corporate Tax Rate’ describe the interaction term of the respective category and the
corporate tax rate. ’APA’ is an indicator variable for the possibility to enter into advance pricing agreements. ’APA
x Corporate Tax Rate’ is the interaction term of this indicator variable and the corporate tax rate. For a description
of the control variables, see the notes to Table 4.
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Table 8: Robustness Checks: Tax Rate Differential, Fixed Effects, Panel 1999-2009
Dependent Variable: Log EBIT (Columns (1)-(2)), Log EBIT/Total Assets (Columns (3)-(4))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax Differential -1.427∗∗∗ -1.436∗∗∗ -1.479∗∗∗ -1.054∗∗∗ -1.037∗∗∗ -1.031∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.367) (0.382) (0.338) (0.343) (0.363)
Tax Differential x Time 0.031 0.032 0.016 0.040 0.039 0.032
(0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032)
Existence of Transfer Pricing 0.105∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
Legislation (0.032) (0.031)
Existence of TP Leg. x 1.054∗∗∗ 0.667∗
Tax Differential (0.385) (0.359)
Category 2 0.102∗∗∗ 0.072∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037)
Category 3 0.106∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.034) (0.031) (0.033)
Category 2 x Tax Differential 1.079∗∗∗ 1.191∗∗∗ 0.615 0.615
(0.410) (0.423) (0.387) (0.402)
Category 3 x Tax Differential 1.032∗∗ 1.256∗∗∗ 0.703∗ 0.782∗
(0.399) (0.431) (0.372) (0.405)
APA -0.006 -0.032
(0.027) (0.026)
APA x Tax Differential -0.116 -0.094
(0.239) (0.234)
Log Costs of Employees 0.502∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Log Fixed Assets 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Corruption Index 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.016 0.034∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
GDP -5.71e-14 -5.12e-14 2.29e-13 3.51e-13∗∗ 3.42e-13∗∗ 5.98e-13∗∗∗
(1.64e-13) (1.66e-13) (1.90e-13) (1.53e-13) (1.56e-13) (1.80e-13)
GDP per Capita/100 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP Growth Rate 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Unemployment 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Industry-Year-Effects
√ √ √ √ √ √
Within R-Squared 0.1790 0.1790 0.1776 0.0370 0.0370 0.0367
#Obs 87,152 87,152 85,415 87,152 87,152 85,415
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Observational unit is the multinational firm, i.e. either the
parent or a wholly owned subsidiary is located in a foreign jurisdiction. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the
firm’s earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). ’Tax Differential’ depicts the difference between the host country’s
statutory corporate tax rate including local income taxes and possible surcharges and the unweighed average tax
rate of all group members. ’Tax Differential x Time’ stands for the interaction term of the tax differential and a time
indicator (values 1 to 11 for the years 1999-2009). ’Existence of Transfer Pricing Legislation’ describes an indicator
variable for the existence of transfer pricing legislation in a given country. ’Existence of TP Leg. x Tax Differential’
stands for the interaction term of such an indicator variable and the tax differential. ’Category 2’ and ’Category
3’ stand for indicator variables for categories 2 and 3 (1= no or only very general anti-avoidance regulations; 2=
Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement is not introduced in national tax law, but is required to
exist in an audit; 3 = Transfer pricing rules exist; documentation requirement exists in national tax law, but must
only be available upon request). ’Category 2 x Tax Differential’ and ’Category 3 x Tax Differential’ describe the
interaction term of the respective category and the tax differential. ’APA’ is an indicator variable for the possibility
to enter into advance pricing agreements. ’APA x Corporate Tax Rate’ is the interaction term of this indicator
variable and the corporate tax rate. For a description of the control variables, see the notes for Table 4.
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